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I. INTRODUCTION  
The death penalty has sparked heated debate for 
centuries. The debate has centered on religious beliefs, 
constitutional issues, moral values, and cost concerns.  The 
national economic crisis has put the costs of executions at the 
forefront of the debate in recent years. Courts and juries have 
begun to consider the cost of execution versus the cost of life 
in prison without parole in the realm of capital sentencing.1 
These new considerations have no place in death penalty 
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John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the 
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of 
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment); Tennessee v. 
Cobbins, State’s Response to Motion to Permit Evidence at 
Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs of the Death Penalty, Knox 
County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009), available at 
http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/051309carjack.pdf.  
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jurisprudence. One’s life, criminal or not, should never be 
taken – or spared – based on dollars and cents.  
Section II of this note presents a scenario in which a 
defendant has been convicted of murder and is now entering 
the sentencing phase of his trial. Section III evaluates the 
available cost studies of executions around the country. 
Section IV focuses on the actual language used in a recent trial 
regarding the cost of the death penalty versus life 
imprisonment.  
Section V considers the various constitutional 
arguments surrounding the consideration of execution costs in 
the sentencing phase of capital cases. Section VI attempts to 
balance the positive and negative aspects of considering 
execution costs from both the prosecution and the defense 
perspectives. Section VII concludes by evaluating ways to 
allow the cost considerations while protecting both the 
defendant’s and the state’s rights in a capital case. 
 
II.  DOES JOHN DESERVE LIFE IN PRISON BECAUSE IT IS 
CHEAPER?2  
Jane, a six-year-old girl, is outside playing on her 
swing set in the backyard. John, a sixty- five-year-old man, 
comes out of the woods and starts pushing her on the swing. 
Jane is thrilled that John is pushing her because her father was 
killed in a car accident when she was three, leaving her with 
no father figure in her life. After five minutes on the swing, 
John asks Jane if she would like to walk with him to see his 
puppy, Izzy. Jane loves puppies and is excited to meet a new 
one. Jane goes with John and is not seen again for ten years. 
For those ten years, John keeps Jane in a storm cellar 
on his property a little over ten miles from Jane’s childhood 
home. He rapes Jane on the first day and continues to do so at 
least twice a week, sometimes more. He keeps her handcuffed 
to the floor of the cellar for the next several years, and feeds 
her soup and crackers once a day. John tortures Jane, burning 
her with his cigarette or making small slits in her tiny arms 
with his hunting knife.  
                                                 
2 This story is fictional and describes a horrific crime the author 
wants readers to consider throughout the note. 
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Jane screams for help for the first few days until John 
binds her mouth with a dirty oil rag and threatens to kill her 
“Mommy” if she is not quiet. Jane endlessly shakes with fear 
every time she hears a noise at the cellar door. Jane is living 
her own hell, at the age of six, with no end in sight.  
One day, after ten years of being tortured and raped, 
Jane decides that she has to find a way out of the cellar and 
away from John. She waits until she hears John’s old truck 
start up and back out of the driveway. She slowly comes out of 
the cellar, which John stopped locking a few months before, 
and smiles at the sight of daylight for the first time in ten 
years. She begins to walk toward the road not knowing fully 
what her plan is once she sees another person. Jane gets about 
half a mile down the road when she hears John’s old truck 
coming back. She tries to run but her legs are so fragile that 
she has a hard time getting her footing. She falls down right as 
John gets to her. 
John gets out of the truck yelling, grabs Jane by her 
matted hair, and slings her in the bed of his truck like a 
ragdoll. A young woman, Julie, drives by and sees the 
exchange between John and Jane and notices Jane is crying 
hysterically. She does not stop but watches as John pulls into 
his driveway and around the back of his house. Julie calls the 
local police department and describes to them what she has 
just witnessed and tells them the location of John’s home.  
John takes Jane back to the cellar and is so angry he 
begins to strike her with his belt. Jane is crying hysterically 
which makes John even more upset and he begins to strike her 
with his fists and kick her. When she does not stop crying, 
John takes Jane’s head and bashes it up against the cellar wall 
until she is no longer crying and her body goes limp.  
John crawls out of the cellar, with a smile on his face, 
and begins walking back to his house at the same time law 
enforcement is pulling into his driveway. Law enforcement 
sees that he is covered in blood, immediately places him under 
arrest, and begins looking for the young girl described by 
Julie. They find a gruesome bloody scene in the cellar with 
Jane’s limp body lying on the floor. John has finally allowed 
Jane to escape her hell. She is dead. 
John eventually confesses to the kidnapping, torture, 
rape, and murder of Jane. He gives law enforcement chilling 
details of the last ten years and shows no remorse for his 
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actions or for killing the sixteen-year-old Jane. After being 
convicted of first degree murder, along with other crimes, 
John sits in the courtroom for his sentencing.  
The judge gives the jury its instructions and explains to 
them the process of determining whether John should be 
sentenced to death or life in prison. The defense has asked the 
judge to include an instruction detailing the costs of executing 
John and the costs of sentencing John to life in prison. This 
instruction is important to the defense because the statistics 
show that it is cheaper to allow John to live in prison for the 
rest of his life than to execute him, and the defense believes 
that the jury will spare John’s life because it is the cheaper 
option for society during the tough economic times. 
This story is a horrific description of the brutal murder 
of a young sixteen-year-old girl, who was taken from her 
childhood home at the age of six. A young girl, tortured and 
raped repeatedly over ten years, and then brutally beaten 
when she tried to escape. A man, who has no remorse for 
taking the life of such an innocent child, and is going to live or 
die based on, among other things, the jury’s feelings about 
money and the cost-benefit of the death penalty versus life 
imprisonment. Money should not be relevant when 
determining whether John lives or dies.  
 
III.  STATISTICS SHOW EXECUTIONS ARE MORE EXPENSIVE 
THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT. 
This note is not simply about the actual costs of 
execution, the actual costs of life in prison or primary based on 
statistics. This note is about whether these costs should be 
allowed to be a deciding factor in determining when a person 
should live or die. With that being said, it is still important to 
evaluate the costs of each and assess the costs both nationally 
and state by state.3 
                                                 
3 The following states have abolished the death penalty: Alaska, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656(1) (2013); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1251 
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There is no national consensus for the cost of capital 
punishment.4 A number of states have never even evaluated 
their costs associated with capital punishment.5 “Of the states 
where reliable estimates are available, the differing 
methodologies used, assumptions made, and applicable 
statutes make generalizations difficult.”6  The 2009 Report 
from the Death Penalty Information Center puts the numbers 
in perspective: 
 
The high costs to the state per execution reflect 
the following reality: For a single death penalty 
trial, the state may pay $1 million more than for 
a non-death penalty trial. But only one in every 
three capital trials may result in a death 
sentence, so the true cost of that death sentence 
is $3 million. Further down the road, only one 
in ten of the death sentences handed down may 
                                                                                                       
(2013); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(b) (West 2014); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.265, § 2 (West 2013) invalidated by 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984) 
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a) 
(West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-18-14 (West 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 
2013) invalidated by People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) 
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-32-01 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 2303 (West 2013); State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (Vt. 2005) 
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); W. VA. CODE § 61-
2-2 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.0135(1)(B), § 940.01(1) (West 2013).  
See also NPR Staff and Wires, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NPR 
(March 09, 2011), available at 
http:www.npr.org/2011/03/09/134394946/Illinois-abolishes-death-
penalty. 
4 Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in 
a Time of Economic Crisis – A Report from the Death Penalty Information 
Center (2009) page 17, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Dieter].  
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
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result in an execution. Hence, the cost to the 
state to reach that one execution is $30 million.7 
 
All studies that have been conducted regarding the 
cost of capital punishment have concluded that execution is 
much more expensive than sentencing a person to life in 
prison; a capital trial, due to many factors but most notably the 
length of capital trials, is much more extensive and expensive, 
and there is, generally, far more appellate and other post-
conviction review of death penalty cases than cases seeking 
only life imprisonment.8 According to the Death Penalty 
Information Center, there are several ways one can approach 
how much capital punishment actually costs.9 First, the costs 
of each individual step in a capital case could be calculated, 
including the investigation, trial, and appeals; however, this 
number would only include a minority of the cases that 
actually go through the whole system.10 A second approach is 
to “measure the extra cost to the state of arriving at one death 
sentence or one execution.”11 Lastly, the total extra costs to the 
state for maintaining a capital punishment system could be 
assessed on a yearly basis.12 
Each of the above approaches has its own pros and 
cons. In the first approach, by evaluating each individual step 
of a capital case, researchers would be able to break the 
statistics down further to determine the most costly step in the 
process. This further evaluation would allow legislatures to 
target costly areas within the process and take steps to 
facilitate lowering the costs of capital cases within their state. 
However, as stated above, this evaluation method only 
calculates cases that go through the entire process and not all 
capital cases. The second approach would allow states to 
evaluate capital cases on a case by case basis and determine 
the exact price of one execution. This method, however, limits 
the calculation to one death sentence when a state may have 
                                                 
7 Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted).  
8 Id at 6. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
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numerous executions that cost the state a tremendous amount 
of money.  
The third approach allows a state to evaluate costs on a 
yearly basis which would give the state the ability to budget 
more efficiently. The problem with this method is that not 
every state will have an execution every year. Rather, if a state 
goes without an execution for several years and then has a 
person sentenced to death, the extra money needed for that 
sentence may not be available within the budget. The third 
approach is also too broad in calculating all extra costs 
associated with a capital case. Out of the three, the first 
method seems to encompass the entire realm of capital case 
expenses in its calculations and may be the best evaluation 
method. 
Several states have conducted research regarding the 
cost of their executions. California spends $137 million per 
year on the death penalty, system wide, while life in prison 
costs only $11.5 million per year.13 Since 1977, California has 
averaged less than one execution every two years making the 
actual cost per execution over $250 million.14 New York had 
no executions but spent $170 million over a nine-year period 
of time prior to abolishing capital punishment.15 New Jersey 
had no executions but spent $253 million over a twenty-five 
year period of time prior to abolition.16 Between 1978 and 
1999, Maryland spent $186 million on capital cases but only 
had five executions, thus, each execution cost $37 million.17  
Different features of a capital punishment system are 
also telling of the exponential cost associated with having this 
system over a system only offering life in prison as a 
maximum punishment. Maryland sought, but did not impose, 
the death penalty in 106 cases which cost the state $71 
                                                 
13 See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, 
Report and Recommendations on the Administration of the Death Penalty 
in California, at 10 (June 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/official/FINAL%20
REPORT%20DEATH%20PENALTY.pdf [hereinafter California 
Commission]. 
14 Id.  
15 Dieter, supra note 4, at 14 n.40.  
16 Id. at 14 n.41. 
17 Id. at 15 n.42.  
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million.18 “The average cost for the defense at trial in a federal 
death case is $620,932, about eight times that of a non-capital 
federal murder case.”19 In Kansas, the trial costs for capital 
cases are about sixteen times greater than for non-capital 
cases, while the appeal costs are twenty-one times higher.20 
California spends over $60 million annually to house 670 
inmates on death row.21 
These staggering numbers reflect several things. First, 
there are more people on death row than ever before and each 
individual on death row costs an additional $90,000 above 
what it would cost to house them for a life in prison 
sentence.22 Second, despite the reinstatement of the death 
penalty in 1976, since then, there have been fewer executions 
per year.23 Third, correctional facilities now have higher 
overall operating costs.24 All of these factors taken together 
contribute to a higher cost per execution.25 Since capital 
punishment was reinstated in 1976, “the country has spent 
about $2.5 billion beyond the costs that would have been 
incurred if life in prison was the most severe penalty.”26 
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR DEATH ELIGIBLE 
DEFENDANTS OUTLINED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed 
numerous constitutional protections for death penalty eligible 
                                                 
18 Id. at 16 n.47.  
19 J. Gould & L. Greenman, OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERVICES OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Update on Cost, Quality, 
and Availability of Defense Representation in Federal Death Penalty Cases 
at 25 (2008), available at 
http:www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/P
ublications/UpdateFederalDeathPenaltyCases.aspx. 
20 Legislative Division of Post Audit State of Kansas, Performance 
Audit Report - Costs Incurred for Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit 
of the Department of Corrections at 13 (2003), available at 
http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf.   
21 California Commission, supra note 13, at 70. 
22 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 17. 
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defendants because death is different from any other 
punishment that a criminal defendant may face. Capital 
defendants are afforded protection against arbitrary and 
capricious death sentences. Evidence considered during the 
sentencing phase must be both relevant and reliable. The 
sentencing phase of a capital trial is subject to the harmless 
error doctrine and should all but guarantee a capital 
defendant an errorless sentence of death. These constitutional 
safeguards are critical to capital sentencing and do not leave 
room for consideration of economic evaluations regarding the 
cost of execution versus life imprisonment. 
 
A. DEATH IS DIFFERENT 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
that “death is different.”27 In 1972, the Supreme Court, for the 
first time, emphasized that death is exceptional in terms of 
punishment for crimes.28 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan stated “death is … an unusually severe punishment, 
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”29 In 
another concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that the 
death penalty differed “from all other forms of criminal 
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total 
irrevocability.”30 
The Supreme Court has also noted several times that 
death is “qualitatively different.”31 In Woodson v. North 
Carolina, the Court noted that “[d]eath, in its finality, differs 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 n.4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 509 n.12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). See also, Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional 
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370, 397-401 
nn.200-206 (1995) (collecting cases for the proposition that “death is 
different”). 
28 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
31 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
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more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term 
differs from one of only a year or two.”32 The Court summed 
up why death is different in its opinion in Gardner v. Florida: 
 
[F]ive Members of the Court have now 
expressly recognized that death is a different 
kind of punishment from any other which may 
be imposed in this country. From the point of 
view of the defendant, it is different in both its 
severity and its finality. From the point of view 
of society, the action of the sovereign in taking 
the life of one of its citizens also differs 
dramatically from any other legitimate state 
action. It is of vital importance to the defendant 
and to the community that any decision to 
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, 
based on reason rather than caprice or 
emotion.33 
 
Death is deliberate. Death is final.  
 
B. A SENTENCE OF DEATH CANNOT BE HANDED DOWN IN 
AN ARBITRARY & CAPRICIOUS MANNER 
Since “death is different,” the Supreme Court has 
developed a “greater level of scrutiny of the capital sentencing 
determination.”34 Courts must strive to make sure executions 
are not handed out in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.35 A 
sentence of death is to be reviewed by appellate courts to 
avoid arbitrary or unfair application of the death penalty.36 
The Supreme Court has developed two general 
conditions to minimize the risk of arbitrary action in capital 
                                                 
32 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
33 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (internal citations 
omitted). 
34 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998-99. 
35 Id.  
36 See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (and cases cited 
therein). 
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sentencing.37 First, courts must set boundaries on the 
sentencer’s judgment to “genuinely narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably 
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”38 
Second, sentencers must be allowed “to consider any relevant 
mitigating factor” that might prevent the sentencer from 
imposing the death penalty.39 
 
i. THE CLASS OF PERSONS DEATH ELIGIBLE MUST BE 
NARROWED 
States must adopt statutes and courts must implement 
procedures that distinguish between those defendants who 
deserve to be executed and those who do not.40 The statutes 
and procedures should also guide juries in deciding on which 
factors support a sentence of death and those factors which do 
not.41  
At the sentencing phase, narrowing occurs when the 
sentencer is required to determine whether aggravating 
circumstances justify imposing the death penalty.42 A 
defendant cannot receive a death sentence unless the trier of 
fact convicts the defendant of murder and finds at least one 
aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty phase.43 
An aggravating circumstance must be narrowly tailored 
                                                 
37 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007). 
38 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 
(1980) (plurality opinion). 
39 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246.  
40 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
188 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) 
(White, J., concurring))). 
41 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (a state statute for 
capital sentencing must: “(1) rationally narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, 
individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible 
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances 
of his crime.”) 
42 Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 (statutory aggravating circumstances 
“circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”). 
43 Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 (2006). 
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enough that it does “not apply to every defendant convicted of 
a murder. . . .”44 
A statute can be effective in limiting the sentencer’s 
discretion if the statute provides: (1) “clear and objective 
standards”; (2) “specific and detailed guidance”; and (3) “an 
opportunity for rational review of the process for imposing a 
sentence of death.”45 The Court in Woodson noted procedures 
that do not give credence to the character of an individual 
defendant or the particular offense “treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass 
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”46 
 
ii. JURIES MUST BE ALLOWED TO CONSIDER MITIGATING 
EVIDENCE 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has time and time 
again stated that juries must be allowed to consider mitigating 
evidence that may excuse the imposition of death on a 
defendant.47 The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give a 
defendant the right to present mitigating evidence in capital 
cases.48 In Lockett, the Court held a sentencer is obliged to 
think about mitigating evidence the defendant offers 
concerning “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record 
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”49  
All relevant mitigating evidence must be allowed to be 
presented to juries in capital cases and the defendant must be 
afforded wide latitude to present the mitigating evidence.50 
                                                 
44 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). 
45 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (quoting, respectively, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
198; Coley v. Georgia, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974); Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976); and Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). 
46 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
47 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246. See also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 
66, 81-82 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982); 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197. 
48 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
49 Id.; see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173-74. 
50 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). See also Abdul-Kabir, 
550 U.S. at 264 (statutory requirement that jury consider only 
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Sentencers in capital cases “must give independent weight” to 
each mitigating circumstance.51 However, when evaluating 
mitigating factors, the sentencer does not have free 
discretion.52 In Brown, the Court upheld the trial court’s 
instruction warning the jury to not be swayed by “mere 
sympathy” when making the determination to give a death 
sentence.53 The Brown Court concluded that a reasonable juror 
would interpret the instruction to mean that he or she should 
ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence and that states may 
prohibit juries from basing their sentencing decisions on 
factors not presented at the trial.54 
It is imperative that capital sentencing juries avoid an 
arbitrary and capricious application of the death sentence. If 
the above statistics were to swing the other direction and show 
that executions were less expensive than imprisoning a person 
for life, juries allowed to consider these cost evaluations may 
begin to arbitrarily put defendants to death because it is 
cheaper for society to do so. By allowing these costs to be 
considered, regardless of the side to which the pendulum 
swings, courts open themselves up to a direct violation of the 
Supreme Court’s rule against arbitrarily applying the death 
penalty. 
Allowing juries to consider the cost of execution versus 
the cost of life in prison without parole does not meet the 
Supreme Court requirement of narrowing the class of death 
eligible persons. To consider the statistics as they are now, 
juries would not sentence any defendants to death because it is 
cheaper for society to keep them in prison for the rest of their 
                                                                                                       
particular kinds of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional); 
Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (sentencer may not 
be precluded from “giving meaningful effect to mitigating 
evidence”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion) (sentencer 
cannot be precluded from considering character or circumstance of 
defendant’s record). 
51 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987). 
52 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (The jury in Brown had been instructed not to be swayed by 
“mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public 
opinion or public feeling.”). 
90                                                 2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015) 
 
lives. It is understandable why a defendant would want to 
offer the statistics as mitigating evidence. However, the 
purpose of aggravating and mitigating evidence is to allow the 
jury to evaluate the individual defendant and the crime itself. 
Even though the statistics would be an extremely powerful 
mitigating argument to keep the defendant alive, the statistics 
do not go toward the individual defendant or the murder itself 
and should not be considered by a jury when determining 
whether to impose a sentence of death.  
 
C. SENTENCING EVIDENCE MUST BE RELEVANT AND 
RELIABLE 
The Eighth Amendment demands any part of a capital 
case be analyzed under a higher level of scrutiny if that part of 
the case affects the sentencing determination.55 A heightened 
standard of reliability is required when determining whether 
death is the most appropriate punishment.56 Constitutional 
standards “require inquiry into the reliability, relevance, 
value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve 
fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the 
defendant and the victim’s family.”57 Unless the evidence is 
both relevant and reliable, it should not be considered during 
the sentencing phase of a capital case. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence demand that only 
material that relates closely to the facts of a case be considered 
by the trier of fact.58 Rule 402 clearly states that relevant 
evidence is admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.59 
Relevant evidence means “evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”60 Trial judges are also 
given the discretion to find relevant evidence inadmissible if 
the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
                                                 
55 New York v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493-94 (N.Y. 1997). 
56 Id. at 494. 
57 Tennessee v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001). 
58 FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, & 403. 
59 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
60 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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misleading to the jury.61 The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that mitigating evidence is admissible in capital cases 
and only has to meet a low threshold test for relevance to be 
admitted.62  
Execution cost-benefit evidence does not meet the 
relevance test under either the Federal Rules of Evidence or 
precedent. This evidence is irrelevant because it does not have 
a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. Jurors can make the same sentence 
determination with this evidence as they would without the 
evidence. Also, this evidence does not relate to the “existence 
of any fact that is of consequence” but only relates to how 
much a state may pay for its capital punishment system to be 
implemented. 
Even if the cost-benefit evidence is found to be 
relevant, courts should still find it inadmissible under Rule 
403. By allowing parties to discuss the cost of executions 
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, juries may 
confuse the issues involved in this phase. The issue in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial is to determine whether the 
defendant receives the death penalty or a lesser punishment. 
The issue is not one of how much an execution may cost and it 
is critical that jurors not be allowed to confuse these two issues 
at such a crucial part of a capital case. 
The cost of an execution versus the costs of life 
imprisonment has no relevance to a capital sentencing phase. 
Only relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence that 
reflects on the individual defendant or the crime itself should 
be considered in the penalty phase of a capital case. A 
Connecticut Superior Court Judge recently dealt with the 
relevance of these costs evaluations and stated: 
 
Economic arguments tailored to specific 
individuals are not only irrelevant but perverse. 
From an economic view, it will thus be more 
expensive to incarcerate the younger defendant 
                                                 
61 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
62 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-
88 (2004) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s test for “constitutional 
relevance”). 
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for the remainder of his life and – in strict 
economic terms – more cost-effective to execute 
him. . . . This argument plainly makes no moral 
sense.63 
 
Overall, statistics tend to be an unreliable source of 
information. “Statistics is as much an art as it is a science.”64 
One author, Darrell Huff, has coined statistical manipulation 
as “statisticulation,” or in other words the use of statistical 
information to misinform society.65 Statistics are vulnerable to 
various manipulations and distortions.66 “The secret language 
of statistics, so appealing in a fact-minded culture, is 
employed to sensationalize, inflate, confuse, and 
oversimplify.”67 “A well-wrapped statistic is better than 
Hitler’s “big lie”[;] it misleads, yet it cannot be pinned on 
you.”68 
To illustrate how easy it is to manipulate the same 
statistics to fit one’s agenda, Huff proposes the following 
example: 
 
You can, for instance, express exactly the same 
fact by calling it a one percent return on sales, a 
fifteen percent return on investment, a ten-
million-dollar profit, an increase in profits of 
forty percent, or a decrease of sixty percent 
from last year. The method is to choose the one 
that sounds best for the purpose at hand and 
                                                 
63 Judge: Execution, prison costs irrelevant, UPI, Oct. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/10/15/Judge-
Execution-prison-costs-irrelevant/UPI-37711287115415 (quoting 
John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the 
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of 
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment)(internal 
quotations omitted). 
64 Darrell Huff, HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 120 (W.W. Norton & 
Company 1954) available at http://www.horace.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/How-to-Lie-With-Statistics-1954-
Huff.pdf. 
65 Id. at 100. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 8. 
68 Id. at 9. 
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trust that few who read it will recognize how 
imperfectly it reflects the situation.69 
 
Going on this proposition, the statistics regarding the 
cost of the death penalty and the cost of life in prison without 
parole are fatally flawed. The statistics that are available are 
based on a judicial system where the death penalty is the 
ultimate penalty. If life in prison without parole was the 
ultimate penalty, the statistics would show that penalty to be 
much more expensive than the lesser penalty of life in prison 
with the option for parole. These statistics are developed to 
promote anti-death penalty arguments and can be skewed in a 
variety of ways to lend credence to any proposition one may 
want to propose. To allow a jury to consider statistics that can 
fluctuate, as needed, while deciding whether or not a 
defendant lives or dies is absurd.  
The individual execution costs will vary depending on 
the age of the defendant, the execution procedure used by the 
state in which the execution is carried out, etc.  This dynamic 
shows that the statistical numbers can always be skewed and 
used in ways that promote whatever policy argument or 
reasoning one may want to promote. To determine whether 
one lives or dies based on flawed, irrelevant, unreliable 
statistics or statistics that can easily be altered should not be 
allowed in capital cases.  
 
D. AN ERROR IN CAPITAL SENTENCING MAY BE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMLESS BUT IT IS STILL AN ERROR 
The harmless error doctrine was first developed by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1967.70 In Chapman, the Court 
decided that even though an error is constitutional, that does 
not render that error resistant to the harmless error analysis.71 
The Court also found that some constitutional errors were so 
fundamental as to defy harmless error analysis and to thus be 
automatically reversed.72 The Chapman Court established the 
rule for determining whether an error was in fact a harmless 
                                                 
69 Id. at 82. 
70 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
71 Id. at 22. 
72 Id. at 23. 
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error: “before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”73 
In 1988, the Court held that the Chapman test was 
equally applicable in the penalty phase of a capital case.74 The 
Court, in Satterwhite, held: “it is important to avoid error in 
capital sentencing proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation of 
the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a 
capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion 
given to the sentencer.”75 The only time the Court has found 
automatic reversible error in a capital case is where a juror has 
been found to be so pro-capital punishment that he is 
effectively unable to not impose a death sentence.76 
The purpose of the harmless error test “reflect[s] a 
balancing of the defendant’s interests in an error-free 
proceeding against the societal interest in finality and judicial 
economy.”77 James Scoville has summed it up nicely: “any 
error in capital sentencing implicates some constitutional 
concerns…the constitutionally compelled sentencing 
discretion in capital punishment proceedings may be 
undermined by error regardless of whether an independent 
constitutional right is violated.”78  
Allowing a jury to consider the cost of execution versus 
the cost of life imprisonment should be deemed an error. One 
can call it “harmless error” but it is still an error and it is an 
error in a case that determines whether a person lives or dies. 
We should strive for a perfect system and an error in death 
sentencing is a permanent mistake and is greater than any 
other mistake allowed in criminal jurisprudence.  
                                                 
73 Id. at 24. 
74 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988). 
75 Id. at 258. 
76 The term “Morgan Precept” comes from the case of Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). 
77James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital 
Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 744 (1987) (quoting United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 502 (1983) (criticizing lower court for its failure 
“to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one 
hand, and the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the 
interests of the victim on the other”)). 
78 Id. at 757.  
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V.  SHOULD JURIES BE ALLOWED TO EVALUATE EXECUTION 
COSTS IN CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING? 
There are valid arguments on both sides regarding 
these cost evaluations. A juror, as a taxpayer, has a vested 
interest in the cost of all trials, especially costly capital murder 
trials. The statistics available calculate the average cost of 
executions and do not allow jurors to evaluate what the 
individual trial they are sitting for will cost. There is no 
national standard or national agency that calculates the cost of 
executions on average around the nation so the statistics 
provided are fundamentally flawed since they are not a 
national average but only an average for a few states.  
 
A. JURIES HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN COSTS 
As taxpayers, every juror in every trial has a vested 
interest in the cost of that prosecution. The costs of a trial 
include the prosecutor’s salary, court-appointed defense 
counsel, the judge’s salary, law enforcement salaries, and 
other various trial costs. These costs are high in a normal 
criminal trial but, due to many factors such as the length of a 
capital trial and the cost of mandatory expert witnesses, are 
exponentially increased in a capital murder trial as shown in 
the statistics above. As the expense of trials increase, local 
taxes likely will be increased to cover the extra costs. 
When calculated, the actual cost per execution per year 
to individual taxpayers is actually quite minimal.79 The United 
States has spent around $2.5 billion on capital cases since 
1976.80 Taxpayers spent, on average, thirty-one cents per year 
on capital cases from 1976 to 2010.81 Individual taxpayers pay 
                                                 
79 To determine the following calculations, the author used the 
statistics included in Section II and divided them by the individual 
state and national census figures, respectively. Note only population 
of eighteen and over was used in these calculations since author 
intends to calculate taxpayer expense. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Population 
Estimates, available at http://www.census.gov. 
80 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15. 
81 $2.5 billion over 34 years (1976-2010) = $7,352,411 per 
year/population of 234,564,071 = $.31 cents per year. 
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around $4.90 a year for capital cases in California.82 Taxpayers 
in New York and New Jersey paid less than $1.50 per year for 
their capital punishment system prior to their states’ abolition 
of the death penalty.83 Maryland taxpayers paid around $2.00 
per year for their capital punishment system.84 These figures 
show that the actual cost to individual jurors, as taxpayers, is 
nominal and goes to show that jurors do not have the vested 
interests that one might think when looking at the larger 
overall state costs.  
While the jurors may have a vested interest as 
taxpayers, the “death penalty itself is not on trial” when it 
comes to cost evaluations.85 The better venue to evaluate the 
cost of execution compared to the cost of life in prison without 
parole is within the legislature, whether it is on a federal or an 
individual state level. Leland Price, Tennessee Assistant 
District Attorney General, recently stated, “public debate 
among our policy makers concerning the economic costs of the 
death penalty is one thing, presenting such evidence to a 
capital jury trying to make an individualized sentencing 
decision is another.”86  
By allowing jurors, as taxpayers, to evaluate the cost of 
execution versus life in prison without parole, courts allow the 
jurors’ personal finances to come into the sentencing equation. 
A capital murder trial is not the place for personal finances to 
have such a huge impact on whether or not the defendant 
lives or dies. In times of economic hardship, the decision to 
render the death penalty would shift in light of individual 
jurors’ financial situations instead of being evaluated in terms 
of the individual convicted of murder and the circumstances 
surrounding the crime itself. 
                                                 
82 California Commission, supra note 13 ($137 million per 
year/population of 27,958,916 = $4.90 per year). 
83 Dieter, supra note 4 at, 15-16 (New Jersey: $252 million over 20 
years = $10,080,000 per year/population of 6,726,680 = $1.50 per 
year; New York: $170 million over 9 years = $18,888,888 per 
year/population of 15,053,173 = $1.25 per year). 
84 Id. at 17 ($186 million over 20 years = $9,300,000 per 
year/population of 4,420,588 = $2.10 per year). 
85 Tennessee v. Cobbins,  2009 WL 2115350, State’s Response to 
Motion to Permit Evidence at Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs 
of the Death Penalty, Knox County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009).  
86 Id. 
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B. NO CASE BY CASE STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE 
There are no individual death penalty trial cost 
statistics available. Each case is different in facts, investigation 
methods, trial strategy, appeals, and post-conviction 
procedures. Therefore, the cost of each capital murder case 
differs from the next and can differ tremendously. 
In Lockett, the Supreme Court determined that the jury 
in a capital murder trial is to make a decision appropriate for 
the individual defendant in light of the crimes he has 
committed.87 The Court reasoned “[g]iven that the imposition 
of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all 
other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an 
individualized decision is essential in capital cases.”88 
To allow non-individualized cost evaluations to play a 
part in a jury’s decision to determine whether the defendant 
lives or if the defendant is executed is contrary to Supreme 
Court capital murder jurisprudence. The Court has made clear 
that capital case sentencing determinations are to be made on 
an individual defendant and individual crime basis. Since 
individual case statistics are unavailable in the death penalty 
arena, courts should not allow juries to consider the difference 
in execution and life in prison without parole in terms of cost. 
Juries should only be allowed to consider the characteristics of 
the individual defendant and the circumstances of the 
individual crime committed.  
 
C. NO NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION OF COSTS 
No national evaluation standard exists for evaluating 
the cost of executions and life in prison without parole in each 
state. With no national evaluation standard in place, all fifty 
states could implement a different method of evaluation. If 
different evaluation methods are used, the number of 
variables considered during the statistical analysis can make 
                                                 
87 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. See also Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 29 (holding that 
evidence regarding the nature and circumstances of the crime or 
relating to the defendant’s character and background is admissible in 
order to meet the constitutional requirement that sentencing be 
conducted in an individualized manner.). 
88 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. 
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the eventual statistics inconsistent among the various states. 
The different parts that would have to be pieced together to 
gather a comprehensive economic picture on the costs of 
execution will vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
depending on the evaluation method.  
As mentioned above, not all death penalty states have 
statistics available regarding the cost of execution or the cost 
of life in prison without parole. If death penalty states want to 
begin to allow juries to consider the costs of executions during 
the sentencing phase of capital cases, they should develop a 
national committee to determine how these costs are 
calculated and the variables that must be considered when 
making these calculations. These steps would make the 
statistics more reliable and allow juries to make true 
determinations regarding the actual costs involved instead of 
relying on fluffed numbers as they stand now. 
 
VI. HOW DO WE AVOID THE TROUBLES OF FLAWED 
STATISTICS THAT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER ONE IS 
SENTENCED TO LIFE OR TO DEATH? 
Courts have three options in determining how cost-
benefit evidence is admitted into the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial: (1) courts may allow only the capital defendant to 
present the evidence; (2) once a defendant offers the statistical 
evidence, the courts may choose to allow the prosecution to 
respond to the argument; or (3) courts may choose to 
completely exclude any cost-benefit evidence or arguments. 
While each of these options have their benefits, ultimately 
courts should follow the latter and not allow execution cost-
benefit evidence or arguments at the sentencing phase of 
capital cases. 
 
A. ONLY THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT CAN PRESENT 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF EXECUTION COST 
Courts may decide to only allow the defense to admit 
the information regarding cost of execution versus life 
imprisonment. This information can be a valuable asset to a 
capital defendant and potentially spare the defendant’s life. 
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Defense attorneys owe a duty to each client to protect 
their constitutional rights and freedoms. This duty does not 
become less important when a client is charged with capital 
murder. If anything, the duty becomes more important to 
spare the life of the client. Defense counsel must attempt to 
sway the jury to spare the life of his or her client and make 
jurors aware of any information that may possibly sway their 
sentencing decision in favor of life in prison.  To this point, it 
is imperative for defense counsel to take all avenues available 
to avoid a sentence of death and offering this statistical 
information for jury consideration is an avenue that must at 
least be attempted. 
A capital defendant has a valid argument that these 
statistics are a form of mitigating evidence that should be 
considered by the jury during the sentencing phase. As the 
statistics stand now, the defendant can make a powerful 
argument to the jury to sentence him to a term of life in prison 
because that sentence would save the jurors, as taxpayers, a 
tremendous amount of money. If a court finds this argument 
to be persuasive and determines the information to be 
mitigating, defendants around the country could be spared 
from execution. 
If one’s life is being determined by twelve people, 
those people should be allowed to consider anything and 
everything while making their determination to take the life of 
another. Human nature and compassion seems to say that 
courts should not deny a defendant the right to plea for his life 
in any manner necessary. If this plea includes using statistical 
data that may curtail a jury from sentencing a defendant to 
death, then so be it.  
 
B. ONCE THE DEFENDANT OPENS THE DOOR, THE 
PROSECUTION CAN RUN THROUGH IT 
Courts may decide to allow the defendant to admit the 
information regarding the cost of execution first and then 
allow the prosecution to counter the information with their 
own arguments. It would only seem fair to allow the 
prosecution to counter any arguments made by the defendant, 
especially statistical arguments.  
Since the statistics are in favor of the capital defendant, 
the only avenue the prosecution has available is to tug at the 
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emotions of the jury. They may remind the jury of how 
heinous the defendant’s actions were. The prosecution may 
also introduce the costs to the victim and the victim’s family. 
They may agree the cost of executing the defendant is high; 
however, that cost can in no way outweigh the cost of losing a 
relative. 
Why should the defendant be given the chance to live 
based on the cost of executions when the defendant took the 
life of an innocent person? How low do the costs have to drop 
before you will deliver justice for the innocent life taken by the 
defendant? The judicial system is supposed to seek justice; are 
you going to allow money to alter what the system is designed 
to do? These are all questions the prosecution may ask the jury 
when trying to counter a capital defendant’s arguments 
regarding the cost of execution.  
A prosecutor may focus on the fact that the cost of a 
punishment should never matter, especially when a person’s 
life has been taken by another. Cost of punishment may be a 
valid consideration in misdemeanor or lower felony cases 
when the options are limited to incarceration or probation or 
community service. However, the cost of execution versus the 
cost of life imprisonment has no place in capital sentencing.  
A prosecutor may explain to the jury that the majority 
of these costs are sunk costs that, in reality, never affect the 
individual jurors as taxpayers. The trial costs, including 
prosecutorial salaries, law enforcement salaries, judge salaries, 
are costs that are going to be paid whether those individuals 
are working on a capital case or on a misdemeanor case. These 
individuals do not receive overtime pay for the extra time put 
into a capital trial. Therefore, the jurors should not put a 
tremendous amount of faith into a defendant’s arguments 
based on execution costs. 
 
C. EXECUTION COST-BENEFIT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS 
SHOULD BE INADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL CASES 
Courts should not allow the information regarding the 
cost of execution and life in prison without parole into the 
realm of death penalty jurisprudence. The courts have juggled 
the many constitutional safeguards surrounding the death 
penalty along with the moral realms of the death penalty for 
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years. To allow economic evaluations to come into play is 
opening death penalty jurisprudence up to further attack. 
Death is different. The decision of whether or not to 
take a person’s life is the ultimate decision a capital juror has 
to make. This decision will forever weigh on a juror’s mind.  
Allowing parties to present execution cost arguments 
to a capital jury is arbitrary and capricious in and of itself. 
Today, if used, the statistics could potentially allow all capital 
defendants to escape execution. The statistics may drastically 
change tomorrow and potentially allow all capital defendants 
to receive a death sentence because it is cheaper for society to 
execute. Depending on the statistics of the day, you live or you 
die. This is the exact thing the Supreme Court has tried to 
avoid in developing the protections afforded by defendants 
from arbitrary and capricious actions by the courts. 
By allowing cost-benefit evidence and arguments into 
the sentencing phase of a capital case, courts will make the 
decision a personal decision for the jurors to make instead of a 
decision based on the circumstances surrounding the crime 
and the individual defendant. The purpose of the sentencing 
phase is to allow the jury to determine one’s punishment 
based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Execution 
statistics do not fit under either of those categories and should 
not be admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The 
punishment decision is not a personal decision; it is a decision 
to be made based on the evidence submitted at trial regarding 
the crime itself and the character of the defendant – nothing 
more, nothing less.  
One could go on for days about the relevance and 
reliability of statistics. Suffice it to say, the statistics offered 
above are neither relevant nor reliable and have absolutely no 
business being admitted into a capital case. The cost statistics 
are completely irrelevant to the crime of murder or any 
circumstances that might surround the crime. The statistics are 
also irrelevant to the character or background of a capital 
defendant. These statistics can be twisted to promote one 
public policy and twisted again to meet another. A famous 
quote sums up the reliability of statistics nicely: “There are 
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.”89 The cost 
                                                 
89 Former British Prime Minister Benjamin “Disraeli would often 
apply with justice and force: ‘There are three kinds of lies: lies, 
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of execution statistics are irrelevant and unreliable and should 
not find their way into death penalty jurisprudence.  
Since capital trial errors are evaluated under the 
harmless error doctrine, it would likely be impossible for 
appellate courts to properly evaluate the effects of allowing 
this statistical information and determine if a harmful error 
had actually occurred. With the cost-benefit evidence being 
questionable, at best, trial courts should avoid putting 
appellate courts in the predicament of trying to guess what 
jurors are thinking as they make sentencing determinations.  
As previously stated, the admittance of execution cost 
evidence should be deemed an error. Harmless or harmful, an 
error is still an error. The judicial system should strive to be a 
perfect system even if that goal seems unattainable at times. 
An error of this magnitude can easily be avoided by courts 
holding that cost-benefit evidence and arguments regarding 
executions are inadmissible.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The death penalty has been under attack for many 
years and the resulting debate has focused on various topics 
that put people’s values into play. To allow an economic 
element into the sentencing phase of capital cases will only 
open the death penalty up for further criticism. Money should 










                                                                                                       
damned lies, and statistics.’” MARK TWAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY- XX 471 (1907), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19987/19987-h/19987-h.htm.  
